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	United States of America		
7			
8	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
9	EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA		
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11	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	CASE NO. 1:20CR106 NONE-SKO	
12	Plaintiff,		
13	v.	STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT;	
14	CARSON SHANE WILHITE,	FINDINGS AND ORDER	
	CARSON SHANE WILHITE,	DATE: December 16, 2020	
15	Defendant.	TIME: 1:00 p.m. COURT: Hon. Sheila K. Oberto	
16		COCKI. Hom. Bhema IX. Guerto	
17	This case is set for a status conference on	December 16, 2020. On May 13, 2020, this Court	
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19	issued General Order 618, which suspends all jury trials in the Eastern District of California until further		
20	notice and allows district judges to continue all criminal matters, excluding time under the Speedy Trial		
21	Act with reference to the court's prior General Order 611 issued on March 17, 2020, the court's		
	subsequent declaration of a judicial emergency based on 18 U.S.C. § 3174, and the Ninth Circuit		
22	Judicial Council's Order of April 16, 2020 continuing this court's judicial emergency for an additional		
23	one-year period and suspending the time limits of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c) until May 2, 2021, with		
24	additional findings to support the exclusion in the Judge's discretion. This and previous General Orders		
25	were entered to address public health concerns related to COVID-19.		
26	Although the General Orders address the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has		
27	emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act's end-of-justice provision "counteract[s] substantive		
28	openendedness with procedural strictness," "demand[ing] on-the-record findings" in a particular case.		
	STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME	1	

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Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). "[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no exclusion under" § 3161(h)(7)(A). *Id.* at 507. Moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. *Id.* at 509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record "either orally or in writing").

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which *Zedner* emphasizes as both mandatory and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, and 617 require specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances are excludable only if "the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless "the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." *Id*.

The General Orders exclude delay in the "ends of justice." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance following Mt. St. Helens' eruption. *Furlow v. United States*, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. *Id.* at 767-68; *see also United States v. Correa*, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing *Furlow* to exclude time following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules.

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-of-justice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). ¹ If continued, this Court should designate a new date for the change of plea. *United States v. Lewis*, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any pretrial

¹ The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make "additional findings to support the exclusion" at the judge's discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D. Cal. March 18, 2020).

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continuance must be "specifically limited in time").

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STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and through defendants' counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

- 1. By previous order, this matter was set for a status conference on December 16, 2020.
- 2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference to March 17, 2021, and to exclude time between December 16, 2020, and March 17, 2021, under Local Code T4.
 - 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
 - a) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to confer with his client, review the government's plea offer, conduct further investigation, and reach a potential resolution.
 - b) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
 - c) The government does not object to the continuance.
 - d) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
 - e) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of December 16, 2020 to March 17, 2021 inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.\(\} 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) (Local Code T4) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
- Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

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1 2	Dated: December 2, 2020	McGREGOR W. SCOTT United States Attorney
3		/s/ KAREN A. ESCOBAR
4		KAREN A. ESCOBAR Assistant United States Attorney
5		Assistant Office States Attorney
6	D-4-4- D	/-/ Dood D. Crowdow
7	Dated: December 2, 2020	/s/ Reed B. Grantham REED B. GRANTHAM
8		Counsel for Defendant Carson Shane Wilhite
9		Carson Share White
10		FINDINGS AND ORDER
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12	IT IS SO ORDERED.	
13	Dated: December 3, 2020	Isl Sheila K. Oberto
14		UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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